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The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (“PPACA” or “Act”)1 is not
a vehicle for tort reform.2 Nothing in the language or legislative history of the
PPACA suggest a limitation on future damages available to patients injured as a
result of medical malpractice.3 The PPACA was neither written to change state
law on subrogation nor modify the rules prohibiting the introduction of evidence
pertaining to collateral sources.4 Even advocates for tort reform in the medical
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1. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S. Code).
2. An ongoing dialogue suggests that the PPACA can be read as a tort reform statute. See
generally David I. Auerbach, Paul Heaton & Ian Brantley, How Will the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act Affect Liability Insurance Costs?, RAND CORP. (2014), http://www.rand.org/
pubs/research_reports/RR493.html (finding that “[l]iability payments could decrease in states that
limit awards based on payments from collateral sources. . . . Medicaid may increase subrogation
against liability awards.”); Ann S. Levin, The Fate of the Collateral Source Rule After Healthcare
Reform, 60 UCLA L. REV. 736 (2013); Joseph McGovern & John Morio, Affordable Care Act Has
Potential to Limit a Defendant’s Exposure for Future Medical Costs in New York Personal Injury
Litigation, JD SUPRA BUS. ADVISOR (Jan. 17, 2014), http://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/
affordable-care-act-has-potential-to-lim-90674.
3. Laura D. Hermer, Aligning Incentives in Accountable Care Organizations: The Role of
Medical Practice Reform, 17 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 271, 272 (2014) (articulating that
“[t]raditional tort reform simply found no place in the [PPACA]”).
4. See Adam G. Todd, An Enduring Oddity: The Collateral Source Rule in the Face of Tort
Reform, the Affordable Care Act, and Increased Subrogation, 43 MCGEORGE L. REV. 965, 982‒
87, 996 (2012); Rebecca Levenson, Comment, Allocating the Costs of Harms to whom They Are
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malpractice field acknowledge that, rather than a remedial limitation imposed
upon aggrieved patients, the PPACA concerns health care and insurance.5 The
only reference to liability limitation or tort reform in the PPACA is the section
regarding a demonstration project designed to provide funding to states
developing litigation alternatives or substitutes.6
The demonstration project provides participating states funding to assess the
efficiency and reliability of its civil litigation model.7 This hardly constitutes
federal tort reform.8 While the Act anticipates studying state processes,
“liability as a tool for quality improvement is not discussed anywhere in the
[PPACA], and it would appear to have been relegated to a fading player in the
drama of health care quality improvement.”9
The legislative history of health care reform provides an even more
enlightening view on federal tort reform. As discussed below, there was a
concerted effort while the bill was navigating the legislative process to
manufacture limitations on noneconomic and punitive damages in health care
lawsuits into the PPACA.10 However, these measures were not included in the
final version of Act.11 When Congress preempts a field or adopts a significant,
rights-altering policy, it is safe to assume that any major measures would be

Due: Modifying the Collateral Course Rule After Health Care Reform, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 921,
940‒47 (2012).
5. Arthur L. Doenecke, Letter to the Editor, Braley Avoids Obvious Need for Tort Reform,
THE DES MOINES REGISTER (Nov. 3, 2014, 12:38 AM), http://www.desmoinesregister.com/
story/opinion/readers/2014/11/03/us-senate-braley-avoids-obvious-need-tort-reform/18398755/
(emphasizing that “[i]t comes as no surprise that Bruce Braley, a trial lawyer by profession, likes
the Affordable Care Act so much. Nowhere in the 2,000 plus pages of the law is there any mention
of tort reform. The [PPACA] seems tailor-made for trial attorneys.”); Angie Drobnic Holan, Tort
Reform in the Health Care Law? No, POLITIFACT (Jan. 21, 2011, 1:30 PM), http://www.politifact.
com/truth-o-meter/statements/2011/jan/21/anthony-weiner/tort-reform-health-care-law-no/; Dr.
Anthony Youn, Health Care Act’s Glaring Omission: Liability Reform, CNN (Oct. 5, 2012, 8:43
AM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/10/05/health/youn-liability-reform/ (protesting that “for all of the
Obama administration’s work in creating this 906-page federal law, there is one glaring omission
that could decrease the cost of health care and help relieve the upcoming physician shortage.
Medical liability reform.”); Medical Liability Reform NOW!, AM. MED. ASS’N 1, 25 (2015), amaassn.org/go/mlrnow.
6. Section 10607 of the Act “authorize[s] the Secretary of Health and Human Services to
award demonstration grants to states for the development, implementation, and evaluation of
alternatives to current tort litigation.” CHRIS L. PETERSON ET AL., CONG. RES. SERV., A
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF PRIVATE HEALTH INSURANCE PROVISIONS OF H.R. 3962 AND
SENATE-PASSED H.R. 3590, 100 (2010), http://www.ncsl.org/documents/health/CRS_Rpt_Comp_
HR3962_HR3590.pdf.
7. See id.
8. See Barry R. Furrow, The Patient Injury Epidemic: Medical Malpractice Litigation as a
Curative Tool, 4 DREXEL L. REV. 41, 66, 104 (2011) (“Medical liability reform is only a minor
component of the [PPACA], with demonstration projects to be funded.”).
9. Id.
10. See infra notes 32‒34 and accompanying text.
11. See infra note 35 and accompanying text.
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clearly evident, discussed at length, and debated extensively.12 It is even more
likely that after such a significant bill is signed into law, these rights-altering
measures would be celebrated by the majority and bemoaned by the minority.
That was, however, not the case with PPACA. While federal tort reform was
debated extensively, the stark fact is that “the [PPACA] does not generally
federalize medical liability[,] . . . reform litigation[,] or malpractice insurance
generally.”13 Limiting a patient’s civil litigation rights or enhancing the options
available to defendants in medical malpractice cases is absent from the Act.
Instead, “the [PPACA] creates strong pressures for providers to integrate and
coordinate their delivery of health care for Medicare recipients through centers,
demonstration projects, and Medicare reimbursement incentives.”14 This hardly
constitutes tort reform.
Those who believe the PPACA incorporates federal tort reform principles
further suggest that the most notable and important aspect of the PPACA—the
health insurance mandate—serves to simultaneously limit damages in medical
malpractice cases and change the rules on admissibility of collateral sources.15
A tort judgment, or so goes the argument, should not cover future medical costs
because federally mandated health insurance policies cannot cover these types
of costs.16 The PPACA coverage, thereby, is the standard measure of damages
in medical malpractice cases. The reasoning continues by suggesting that
evidence of current or future coverage—currently deemed inadmissible in a
number of states under the collateral source rule—should be rendered
admissible, could serve to offset damages attributable to direct costs, or, at least,
serve as a guideline.17
Taken together, if insurance plans will not cover future medical expenses
under the Act, then those expenses cannot be factored into a personal injury
award because they exceed the scope of the minimal coverage the PPACA
requires. This postulation is simple, yet incorrect, because the PPACA does not
impose limitations on future medical expenses in personal injury malpractice
cases by virtue of its insurance mandate.18
First, there is nothing in the PPACA that mandates or even contemplates that
outcome. The idea that the PPACA changes the rules on the admissibility of

12. See infra notes 33‒34 and accompanying text.
13. Furrow, supra note 8, at 104.
14. Id. at 105.
15. See sources cited supra note 2.
16. See infra note 214 and accompanying text.
17. Mark Yagerman & Max Bookman, How Obamacare May Limit Projected Expenses in
Personal Injury Life Care Plans, (2014), https://cardozo.yu.edu/sites/default/files/Yagerman
Bookan.HowObamacareMayLimitProjectedExpensesInPersonalInjuryLifeCarePlans.pdf.
18. See infra notes 19‒23 and accompanying text.
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collateral sources or limits future damages is nothing more than the hope of those
scavenging for vindication, and not the reality of the PPACA.19
Second, the few cases that have considered this contention have rejected it. In
Leung v. Verdugo Hills Hospital,20 the plaintiff, prevailing in a malpractice
action, received both current and future compensatory damages.21 The
defendant-hospital argued that if the plaintiff were to receive future costs, the
collateral source rule limitation should be modified in accordance with a state
statute.22 Because the PPACA rules on limitations of future “federally mandated
. . . insurance options makes the prospect of future health insurance coverage for
plaintiff anything but speculative[,]” the hospital argued, evidence of the
plaintiff’s then current insurance should be admissible.23
The court, dismissing the defendant’s arguments, recognized that the
possibility of future medical insurance as contemplated in the PPACA did not
form a basis to conclude that the plaintiff’s future needs would be met.24 The
court considered that the PPACA’s individual mandate “standing alone, is
irrelevant to prove reasonably certain insurance coverage . . . because it has no
tendency in reason to prove that specific items of future care and treatment will
be covered, the amount of that coverage, or the duration of that coverage.”25
Leung was exactly on point: the PPACA may not have been designed to cover
all future losses a defendant caused and a plaintiff experiences, but it certainly
does not limit a judgment or future needs. Introducing a current insurance
policy, in contravention of the collateral source rule, is erroroneous.26 Further,
introducing a current insurance policy to show what is unavailable through the
PACCA insurance later on—and, more importantly, what should not be
available in a personal injury case involving medical malpractice—is beyond
speculative, fantasy, or perhaps defensive magical thinking.

19. See, e.g., supra note 2 (predicting a possible reduction in damages exposure to personal
injury defendants as a result of the PPACA).
20. Leung v. Verdugo Hills Hosp., No. B204908, 2013 WL 221654 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 22,
2013), review denied (May 1, 2013). On appeal from the Superior Court of Los Angeles County,
the Second District Court of Appeal did not address the issue of the admissibility of future medical
costs. Leung v. Verdugo Hills Hosp., 282 P.3d 1250, 1261 (Cal. 2012). The California Supreme
Court, however, reversed the court of appeals, ordering consideration of future insurance coverage
in calculating damages. Id. On remand, the appellate court held, nonetheless, that the “mere
possibility that private insurance coverage will continue, and the availability of government
programs for the purchase of insurance, do not, in themselves, constitute relevant, admissible
evidence of the future insurance benefits that a plaintiff is reasonably certain to receive.” Leung,
2013 WL 221654, at *11.
21. Leung, 2013 WL 221654, at *13.
22. Id. at *3.
23. Id. at *10.
24. Id. at *11.
25. Id.
26. Id.
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There is another way to assess this contorted interpretation of the PPACA.
While the PPACA was intended to provide universal health coverage,27 the
belief that every future cost associated with an act of malpractice would be
covered by the minimal health insurance policy under the PPACA is at odds with
reality. Future unanticipated costs associated with various types of therapy (e.g.,
occupational or physical) are not covered in any meaningful way by most
insurance policies.28 Future pain, loss of mobility, decline in function and
appearance, and many other long-term effects of instances of malpractice are not
covered in every health insurance policy the PPACA contemplates. However,
these maladies are, and should be, covered in a malpractice judgment or
settlement. The limits of the PPACA do not affect the capacity of courts to
ensure that these malpractice-induced needs are met.
I. LEGISLATIVE PATH OF THE PPACA DOES NOT INCLUDE CHANGES TO TORT
LIABILITY
The PPACA was introduced into the 111th U.S. Congress in September
2009,29 and passed the U.S. Senate that December.30 The Act then passed the
U.S. House of Representatives with certain changes on March 21, 2010, and
President Obama signed the bill into law shortly thereafter.31 During the Senate
debate, there was considerable political pressure to incorporate tort limitation
language (i.e., tort reform), particularly a provision capping damages.32
Proponents direct attention to § 6801 of the PPACA, which suggests that it was
the “[s]ense of the Senate” that “health care reform presents an opportunity to
address issues related to medical malpractice and medical liability insurance.”33
During the floor debates, notably Republican Senate Minority Leader Mitch
McConnell contended that the health care proposals under consideration failed
to include any language limiting malpractice liability and urged his colleagues

27. Two years into the PPACA, there were still thirty-two million people without health
insurance. Jason Millman, Who Is Still Uninsured Under ObamaCare—and Why, WASH. POST
(Nov. 12, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2014/11/12/who-is-stilluninsured-under-obamacare-and-why/.
28. How to Avoid Surprise Medical Bills, THE WALL ST. J., http://guides.wsj.com/health/
health-costs/how-to-avoid-surprise-medical-bills/ (last visited Oct. 9, 2015).
29. H.R. 3590 (111th): Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, GOVTRACK.US,
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/111/hr3590 (last visited Nov. 2, 2015).
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. See Stephan F. Hayes, Obama Taps Ex-Trial Lawyer Lobbyist to Look at Tort Reform,
THE WEEKLY STANDARD (Sept. 10, 2009, 1:36 PM), http://www.weeklystandard.com/weblogs/
TWSFP/2009/09/obama_taps_extrial_lawyer_lobb.asp; In Gesture of Bipartisanship, President
Obama to Discuss Medical Malpractice Reform Tonight, ABC NEWS (Sept. 9, 2009, 4:36 PM),
http://blogs.abcnews.com/politicalpunch/2009/09/in-gesture-of-bipartisanship-president-obama-to
-discuss-medical-malpractice-reform-tonight.html.
33. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, H.R. 3590, 111th Cong. § 6801(a) (2010) (as
amended by the Senate and House).
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to rectify it.34 Nevertheless, the Senate version of the bill upon its return to the
House did not include any tort reform provisions.35
After Senate passage, the House Rules Committee took up tort reform and the
PPACA shortly before President Obama signed the bill into law. The
Committee debated, but failed to pass, a proposal that would have added a
section “based on the medical liability reforms adopted in Texas.”36 Subsequent
amendments touched on the subject without changing the fact that the Act does
not limit tort liability.37
Even before President Obama took office, the 110th Congress held seventeen
hearings on access to healthcare,38 often focused on enhanced subrogation39 and
relaxation of collateral source restrictions.40 Yet, none of these proposals made
it into the PPACA.41 Likewise, an effort to place caps on damages was
thwarted.42 Other efforts to limit liability, including the America’s Healthy
Future Act that “would have provided incentives through Medicaid for states to
enact medical malpractice reforms,” also failed to pass.43 In short, tort reform
efforts were explicit and were explicitly rejected.
While President Obama paid lip service to tort reform supporters throughout
the health care reform debate, he did not take the opportunity to speak on the
topic when he signed the PPACA.44 Later, speaking before a meeting of the
American Medical Association, President Obama noted that there are “legally

34. Catharine Richert, McConnell Gets It Right on Medical Malpractice Reform,
POLITIFACT.COM (Dec. 2, 2009, 6:08 PM), http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/statements/
2009/dec/02/mitch-mcconnell/mcconnell-gets-it-right-medical-malpractice-reform/.
35. Id.
36. COMM. ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, H.R. REP. NO. 111-299, pt. 1, at 1175‒76 (2009)
(detailing Rep. Burgess’s proposed amendment which was similar to measures in place in Texas
since 2003); see also Archive of Summary of Amendments Submitted to the Rules Committee for
H.R. 4872—Reconciliation Act of 2010, U.S. HOUSE OF REP. COMM. ON RULES (Mar. 20,
2010, 6:20 PM), http://democrats.rules.house.gov/amendment-summary/summary-amendmentssubmitted-rules-committee-hr-4872-reconciliation-act-2010.
37. See, e.g., H.R. 5243, 111th Cong. § 3513(b) (2010); SEQUESTER REPLACEMENT
RECONCILIATION ACT OF 2012, H.R. REP. NO. 112-470, at 54, 85 (the section on liability reform
that would have severely limited future damages, but was not passed).
38. H.R. REP. NO. 111-299, pt. 1, at 328 (2009).
39. H.R. 3200, 111th Cong. § 136 (2009).
40. See Todd, supra note 4, at 982 n.131.
41. See id. at 968‒69.
42. LOUISE SLAUGHTER, COMM. ON RULES, H.R. REP. NO. 111-330, at 85‒87 (2009). In its
initial draft, the Affordable Health Care for America Act and the Medicare Physician Payment
Reform Act of 2009—H.R. 3962—included caps on noneconomic and punitive damages and
limited attorney fees; however, it also included a generous section on patient injury compensation
that severely limited subrogation rights. Id.
43. S. REP. NO. 111-89, at 449 (2009).
44. Richert, supra note 34; see also Press Release, President Barack Obama, Remarks by the
President and Vice President at Signing of the Health Insurance Reform Bill (Mar. 23, 2010)
(containing no comments in the remarks by the President regarding tort reform).
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vulnerable” doctors and other health care providers, but that was the extent of
his comments on the subject.45 President Obama’s inaction did not go unnoticed.
Howard Dean, former Democratic National Committee Chairman, noted:
When you go to pass a really enormous bill like that, the more stuff
you put in it, the more enemies you make, right? And the reason that
tort reform is not in the bill is because the people who wrote it did not
want to take on the trial lawyers in addition to everyone else they were
taking on.46
Another bill, the Preservation of Access to Care for Medicare Beneficiaries
and Pension Relief Act of 2010,47 initially mandated the establishment of
standards for the “coordination and subrogation of benefits and reimbursement
of payments in cases of qualified health benefits and plans.”48 However, the
subrogation of benefits language was removed before the bill was ultimately
enacted.49 Consequently, there is nothing in the PPACA or subsequent
legislation dictating new terms or criteria for subrogation of benefits or collateral
source standards at the federal level.
II. INITIATIVES BEYOND INSURANCE TO IMPROVE HEALTH CARE
Beyond the insurance programs and substantive changes in insurance
coverage (e.g., eliminating the practice of denying coverage based on a preexisting condition),50 the PPACA contemplates the possibility of various
training programs and pilot initiatives.51 These programs, central to the massive
effort to reconfigure health care, seek to allow most patients to maintain their
current health insurance plans and current doctor-patient relationships.52
45. See Richert, supra note 34.
46. In Gesture of Bipartisanship, President Obama to Discuss Medical Malpractice Reform,
supra note 32.
47. Pub. L. No. 111-192, 124 Stat. 1280 (2010).
48. H.R. 3962, 111th Cong. § 236 (as introduced in the House on Oct. 29, 2009).
49. See Preservation of Access to Care for Medicare Beneficiaries and Pension Relief Act of
2010, Pub. L. No. 111-192, 124 Stat. 1280 (showing omission of proposed § 236 in enacted
legislation).
50. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-3 (2012).
51. See, e.g., id. at §§ 3023, 5301‒5302 (2010) (providing examples of pilot and training
programs); see also ANDREW COHEN, U. MASS. MED. SCH., CTR. FOR HEALTH L. & ECON.,
PATIENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT (H.R. 3590)—PILOT PROGRAMS,
DEMONSTRATION PROJECTS, AND GRANTS, 5‒15 (Apr. 2, 2010), http://www.umassmed.edu/
uploadedFiles/CWM_CHLE/Landing_Pages/Pilot%20Programs%20Demonstration%20Project%
20and%20Grants%20in%20PPACA%204-26-10%20Final.pdf (detailing specific sections within
the PPACA that provide funding for pilot programs to improve quality of healthcare access and
training to expand the healthcare workforce).
52. 42 U.S.C. § 18011 (2011) (seeking to secure the right of individuals to maintain existing
coverage). Suffice it to say that there is some disagreement on whether the PPACA achieved either
of these goals. See, e.g., Peter Roff, Obama Lied, My Heath Care Died, US NEWS (Oct. 11,
2013, 1:05 PM), http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/peter-roff/2013/10/11/obama-lied-i-lostmy-health-insurance-plan-due-to-obamacare; If Your Grandfathered Health Plan is Changed or
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In conjunction with these lofty goals, the PPACA also provides for a modest
non-compulsory program designed to assist states considering options to
streamline the healthcare process and attempting to reduce the cost of in-state
malpractice claims (e.g., using arbitration to settle disputes between doctors and
their patients who are victims of medical malpractice).53 The premise for this
program is mistakenly that both tort law and the civil justice system are
fundamentally flawed. This troubling bias is articulated by Professor Abigail R.
Moncrieff, who stated that “[i]f market forces or administrative enforcement
works as well as or better than private litigation, then we ought to embrace rather
than resist the Court’s assault on private actions. In that case, private actions
might inefficiently replicate regulatory deterrence.”54
This initiative is the closest the PPACA comes to suggesting tort reform.
Notwithstanding the fact that compulsory arbitration in medical malpractice
cases violates individuals’ Seventh Amendment right to a trial in an Article III
court,55 even permitting states under the PPACA to consider this option is a
terrible idea.56
Beyond this minor option in the Act, the most important, obvious, and highly
ambitious goal of the PPACA is the mandate to create an accessible insurance
acquisition system resulting in health coverage for all and reducing health care
delivery costs in the long term.57 This mandate, not the crabbed and distorted
reading of a limitation on damages, is the ultimate goal of the PPACA.
This greater goal of insuring every U.S. citizen is inconceivably vast and
particularly challenging.
The number of programs required—and the

Cancelled, HEALTHCARE.GOV, https://www.healthcare.gov/current-plan-changed-or-cancelled/
(last visited Aug. 12, 2015). Nonetheless, it is not the goal of this paper to assess whether these
promises have been fulfilled.
53. 42 U.S.C. § 280g-15(a) (2012) (providing funds “for the development, implementation,
and evaluation of alternatives to current tort litigation for resolving disputes over injuries allegedly
caused by health care providers or health care organizations”).
54. Abigail R. Moncrieff, The Supreme Court’s Assault on Litigation: Why (and How) It
Might Be Good for Health Law, 90 B.U. L. REV. 2323, 2327 (2010).
55. See generally Mark E. Bunditz, The High Cost of Mandatory Consumer Arbitration, 67
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 133 (2004); Jennifer Schulz, Comment, Arbitrating Arbitrarily: How
the U.S. Supreme Court Empowered the Arbitrator at the Expense of the Judge and the Average
Joe, 44 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1269 (2011); David S. Schwartz, Understanding Remedy-Stripping
Arbitration Clauses: Validity, Arbitrability, and Preclusion Principles, 38 U.S.F.L. REV. 49 (2003);
Cory Tischbein, Comment, Animating the Seventh Amendment in Contemporary Plaintiffs’
Litigation: The Rule, or the Exception?, 16 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 232 (2013) (criticizing the Supreme
Court for favoring arbitration, undervaluing the Seventh Amendment, and minimizing the
importance and necessity of jury trials).
56. See Tischbein, supra note 55, at 233‒34. Implementation of this initiative is suggested
through the Public Health Services Act, which authorizes the Secretary of Health and Human
Services “to award demonstration grants to states for the development . . . of alternatives to current
tort litigation.” 42 U.S.C. § 280g-15(a) (2012).
57. See generally Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat.
119 (2010).
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commitment to a better process and outcome—remains historic.58 There is no
room for a self-interested anti-patient edict abolishing future medical costs in
medical malpractice cases.
Naturally, in thousands of pages of legislation, it is possible that a given
section of text scurries into a shadowy corner of a bill, waiting behind dense
legislative undergrowth, which would surprise supporters of a bill. Thus far,
such stealth language has yet to be found in the PPACA. While the PPACA is
a complex law, it does not limit patient rights, decrease accountability for
physician misconduct, reconfigure the notions of a fair trial by changing
collateral source doctrine, or change current law on subrogation by insurance
companies.
The PPACA funds both the Community Health Center Fund and the National
Health Service Corps.59 The Act underwrites the cost of the Prevention and
Public Health Fund, which develops programs on disease prevention and
wellness, such as the Patient-Centered Outcomes Research Trust Fund and the
Health Insurance Reform Implementation Fund.60 Beginning in 2010, “the
[PPACA] included more than $100 billion in direct appropriations over the 10year period” essentially designed to adjust, support, and promote health
insurance, health care, Medicare, public and community health initiatives, child
and long-term care, and medical research.61 A twisted and biased interpretation
of collateral source or subrogation involving third party claims is hardly the
same concept.
As for the state programs, the PPACA authorizes the U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services (HHS) to award states five-year grants to develop
and test “alternatives to current tort litigation for resolving disputes over injuries
allegedly caused” by health care professionals.62 In order to apply for an HHS
grant, a state must submit an application to the HHS Secretary outlining its nonlitigation alternative.63 Each application undergoes “rigorous peer review by
independent, scientific experts[,]” and the “[a]ward decisions . . . reflect peer
review scores, program balance, technical merit[,] and feasibility.”64

58. See generally C. STEPHEN REDHEAD, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41301,
APPROPRIATIONS AND FUND TRANSFERS IN THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT (2015), https://www.fas.
org/sgp/crs/misc/R41301.pdf (detailing the forty-seven different mandatory appropriations of the
ACA).
59. See generally Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat.
119 (2010), as amended by the Health Care and Education and Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L.
No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 119 (2010); REDHEAD, supra note 58, at 4.
60. REDHEAD, supra note 58, at 4.
61. Id. at 3‒4.
62. 42 U.S.C. § 280g-15(a)‒(b) (2012).
63. Id. § 280g-15(c)‒(d).
64. Press Release, The White House, Fact Sheet: Patient Safety and Medical Liability Reform
Demonstration (Sept. 17, 2009), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/fact-sheet-patientsafety-and-medical-liability-reform-demonstration.

10

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 65:1

The PPACA provides specific requirements of what constitutes an
“alternative[] to current tort litigation.”65 Such alternatives must facilitate
dispute resolution and “promote a reduction of health care errors by encouraging
the collection and analysis of patient safety data related to disputes by
organizations that engage in efforts to improve patient safety and the quality of
health care.”66 Further, states must show that their plan furthers alternative
dispute resolution, the disclosure of medical errors, and patient education
concerning the difference between tort litigation and other available alternatives,
while still allowing patients to sue.67 The state plan, in addition, must neither
conflict with current state tort law nor place limitations on patients’ legal rights
or access to the justice system.68 Finally, state grantees must provide the
Secretary of HHS with annual reports that evaluate the effectiveness of the
alternative(s).69 This, again, is hardly suggestive of federal tort reform. The
behavior of the federal government under the scope of the PPACA further serves
to support this conclusion.
In June 2010, the Agency for Health Research and Quality opened a
solicitation for more grant applications.70 However, Congress did not
appropriate the requested funding in 2012 and 2013.71 Moreover, President
Obama’s 2015 fiscal budget does not include any explicit funding for these state
run medical liability reform programs.72 The American Medical Association has
called on Congress to make funds available for these grants.73
In addition, there was an unsuccessful quest in the PPACA debate to
encourage state pilot projects to include damage caps, which is classic tort
reform.74 Opponents overwhelmingly thwarted this suggestion, arguing that
damage caps are patently unfair and reduce accountability, which, according to
the Congressional Budget Office, directly results in an increase of patient
deaths.75 There is no evidence to support the belief that capping damages serves
65. Affordable Care Act § 10607; 42 U.S.C. § 280g-15(c)(2).
66. Affordable Care Act § 10607; 42 U.S.C. § 280g-15(c)(1)(B).
67. Affordable Care Act § 10607; 42 U.S.C. § 280g-15(c)(2).
68. 42 U.S.C. § 280g-15(c)(2)(H)‒(I).
69. Id. § 280g-15(e)(1).
70. Medical Liability Reform NOW!, AM. MED. ASS’N 1, 33 (2015), ama-assn.org/go/
mlrnow.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. See Leonard J. Nelson, III, et al., Medical Liability and Health Care Reform, 21 HEALTH
MATRIX 443, 476‒77, 484 (2011) (finding that the push to encourage damage caps was led by
Republicans and physician groups, but evidence showing the effectiveness of damage caps on
health care costs was questionable). Furthermore, President Obama has argued that medical
liability reform should be included in health care reform, but his support does not extend to damage
caps. Id. at 504‒05.
75. Sen. Dick Durbin on Medical Malpractice Reform at White House Health Summit, in
WASH. POST (Feb. 25, 2010, 5:12 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/
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as a deterrence measure.76 By failing to deter instances of malpractice, a federal
cap on medical liability damages, therefore, would not significantly reduce the
costs of heath care.77 In the end, the cap effort was ultimately not included in
the PPACA.
As was the case with other efforts to pervert the PPACA and utilize its
language to lessen patient rights, the very essence of the arguments forwarded
by proponents suggesting that the PPACA contemplates tort reform were, in
fact, considered by Congress and wholly rejected.
III. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SUBROGATION, THE COLLATERAL SOURCE RULE,
AND THE PPACA
As mentioned earlier, one might conclude that because PPACA-approved
insurance does not require compensation for future medical costs, and many
people will only have the PPACA-mandated health insurance,78 the source of
funds should be known at trial, in contravention of the collateral source rule.
Because insurers’ recoupment through subrogation will be bounded by that
limitation, the PPACA, in effect, limits tort liability. This tortured reasoning is
simply incorrect.
Each state has its own subrogation and collateral source policies.79 Some
states permit only one of these doctrines, some permit both, while others prohibit
both.80 While the PPACA implicates “normative benefits accrued by continuing
to impose the collateral source rule[,]” it does not stabilize the various state
approaches to subrogation.81 The importance of this distinctive matter is best
framed by Professor Adam Todd, who states: “[t]he restrictions on full
subrogation found in many jurisdictions allow the collateral source rule to
2010/02/25/AR2010022504290.html. As doctors and hospitals lose accountability, according to a
study by the Congressional Budget Office, approximately 4,800 patients will die every year. Id.
Senator Durbin argues that this finding, in conjunction with the Institute of Medicine’s finding that
98,000 Americans die each year due to medical malpractice, justifies inclusion of medical errors
into the bill. Id.
76. See Nelson, III, et al., supra note 74, at 448 (arguing that damage “caps do not adequately
address the shortcomings of the current medical liability system with respect to both its deterrence
and compensation goals”).
77. See id. at 476 (concluding “[a]t this time it is not clear that a cap will significantly reduce
health care costs . . . as result of federal medical liability reform”).
78. See id. at 450 (finding that PPACA will always have a source of payment for future health
care costs, even the insured who are unemployed).
79. See Todd, supra note 4, at 988 (finding that the collateral source rule and subrogation
have a symbiotic relationship determined by the jurisdiction’s relevant subrogation rule. Any
proposed federal change to the collateral source rule would have to take into account each
jurisdiction’s subrogation rules).
80. See id. at 990‒92 (finding that the common law rule of permitting contractual subrogation
has come under assault by courts and legislatures who have adopted either one, both, or none of the
subrogation and collateral source policies).
81. Todd, supra note 4, at 968 (finding that the Affordable Care Act does not settle the various
and conflicting state approaches to subrogation and the collateral source rule).
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survive because the rule plays an important administrative and equitable
function in the determination of subrogation rights. As such, the rule is
particularly important when full subrogation is prohibited or restricted.”82
“Abrogating the collateral source rule, absent subrogation,” Professor Todd
posits, entitles a defendant to a reduction in liability, and, as a result, “allows the
defendant to escape the full cost of the risk-taking behavior.”83
A. The Collateral Source Rule
In 1854, the collateral source rule was first recognized in the United States in
Monticello v. Mollison.84 In Monticello, the Court correctly recognized that a
person’s own insurance, like any other personal asset, should not enter into a
determination of what should be paid by a party found to have caused the harm.85
The Monticello ruling has since been diluted in numerous states.86 A state
survey shows a remarkable variation in the treatment of collateral sources.87
States apply the collateral source rule inconsistently,88 and many have adopted
caps in medical malpractice cases.89 Some states recognize the entire collateral
source rule, including Arizona,90 Arkansas,91 District of Columbia,92 Hawaii,93

82. Id.
83. Id. at 986.
84. 58 U.S. 152, 155 (1854) (finding that “[t]he contract with the insurer is in the nature of a
wager between third parties, with which the trespasser has no concern”); see Michael W. Cromwell,
Cutting the Fat Out of Health-Care Costs, 62 OKLA. L. REV. 585, 589 (2010).
85. Monticello, 58 U.S. at 155.
86. See Richard C. Witzel Jr., The Collateral Source Rule and State-Provided Special
Education and Therapy, 75 WASH. U. L. Q. 697, 701‒05 (1997) (describing the development of the
collateral source doctrine and its role in tort reform).
87. See Lori A. Roberts, Rhetoric, Reality, and the Wrongful Abrogation of the Collateral
Source Rule in Personal Injury Cases, 31 REV. LITIG. 99, 101‒02 (2012).
88. See id.
89. See Adam D. Glassman, The Imposition of Federal Caps in Medical Malpractice Liability
Actions: Will They Cure the Current Crisis in Health Care?, 37 AKRON L. REV. 417, 431 (2004).
90. See Lopez v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 129 P.3d 487, 491 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2006) (stating that
the collateral source rule is “well established” in Arizona); but see ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12565 (2014) (permitting collateral source rule evidence to be introduced to the jury in malpractice
actions).
91. See Jewell v. Fletcher, 377 S.W.3d 176, 190 (Ark. 2010) (permitting the collateral source
rule, while recognizing that double recovery may result).
92. See Dist. of Columbia v. Jackson, 451 A.2d 867, 870 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (applying the
common law collateral source rule within the District of Columbia).
93. See Bynum v. Magno, 101 P.3d 1149, 1154 (Haw. 2004) (applying the common law
collateral source rule in Hawaii).
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Illinois,94 Kentucky,95 Louisiana,96 Maine,97 Mississippi,98 Montana,99
Nebraska,100 New Hampshire,101 New Mexico,102 North Dakota,103 South
Carolina,104 South Dakota,105 Vermont,106 Virginia,107 West Virginia,108 and
Utah.109

94. See Wills v. Foster, 892 N.E.2d 1018, 1030 (Ill. 2008) (holding that Illinois permits the
use of the collateral source rule).
95. See Leighton v. CSX Transp., Inc., 338 S.W.3d 818, 820 (Ky. Ct. App. 2011) (stating that
the collateral source rule is followed in Kentucky).
96. LA. CODE EVID. ANN. art. 409 (2013) (prohibiting introduction of collateral source
evidence to jury); see also Suhor v. Lagasse, 770 So. 2d 422, 426‒27 (La. Ct. App. 2000)
(prohibiting application of the collateral source rule to federal aid programs, such as Medicare or
Medicaid).
97. See Potvin v. Seven Elms, Inc., 628 A.2d 115, 116 (Me. 1993) (permitting the collateral
source rule and broadening the application even beyond tort actions); but see Werner v. Lane, 393
A.2d 1329, 1335‒36 (Me. 1978) (applying the collateral source rule, but holding with proper
discretion that the judge can allow collateral source evidence under certain circumstances).
98. See Busick v. St. John, 856 So. 2d 304, 309 (Miss. 2003) (stating that the collateral source
rule is followed in Mississippi).
99. See Thomsen v. State by & Through Dep’t of Highways, 833 P.2d 1076, 1078 (Mont.
1992) (prohibiting the introduction of collateral source evidence to the jury).
100. See Mahoney v. Neb. Methodist Hosp., 560 N.W.2d 451, 457 (Neb. 1997) (recognizing
application of the collateral source rule in Nebraska); Huenink v. Collins, 147 N.W.2d 508, 509
(Neb. 1966) (citing the collateral source rule in rejection of appellant’s argument).
101. See Moulton v. Groveton Papers Co., 323 A.2d 906 (N.H. 1974) (holding that New
Hampshire observes the collateral source rule); but see Cyr v. J.I. Case Co., 652 A.2d 685, 688
(N.H. 1994) (holding that collateral source evidence may still be admissible for another purpose).
102. See Selgado v. Commercial Warehouse Co., 526 P.2d 430, 434‒35 (N.M. Ct. App. 1974)
(holding that the collateral source rule does not reduce damages recoverable from the tortfeasor,
but collateral source evidence may be admissible to the jury for another purpose).
103. See Keller v. Gama, 378 N.W.2d 867, 868 (N.D. 1985) (upholding North Dakota’s use of
the collateral source rule).
104. See Estate of Rattenni v. Grainger, 379 S.E.2d 890 (S.C. 1989) (stating that South
Carolina follows the collateral source rule).
105. See Papke v. Harbert, 738 N.W.2d 510, 536 (S.D. 2007) (prohibiting introduction of
collateral source evidence to the jury).
106. See Windsor Sch. Dist. v. State, 956 A.2d 528, 542 (Vt. 2008) (applying the collateral
source rule, which is recognized in Vermont).
107. See Radvany v. Davis, 551 S.E.2d 347, 348 (Va. 2001) (prohibiting introduction of
collateral source evidence to the jury).
108. See Kenney v. Liston, 760 S.E.2d 434, 446 (W. Va. 2014) (prohibiting introduction of
collateral source evidence to the jury).
109. See Wilson v. IHC Hosps., Inc., 289 P.3d 369, 391 (Utah 2012) (holding that the jury
cannot take the collateral source rule into account for jury verdict).
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Other states have abrogated the collateral source rule, including Alabama,110
California,111 Connecticut,112 Georgia,113 Idaho,114 Michigan,115 Ohio,116 Rhode
Island,117 Tennessee,118 Utah,119 and Washington.120
Finally, some states permit use of the collateral source rule subject to various
limitations, including Alaska,121 Colorado,122 Delaware,123 Florida,124

110. ALA. CODE § 6-5-545 (2014) (abrogating collateral source rule for evidence admissible
at trial); see also Marsh v. Green, 782 So. 2d 223, 233 (Ala. 2000) (holding that the abrogation of
the collateral source rule under § 6-5-545 is constitutional).
111. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333.1 (West 2014) (abrogating the collateral source rule in medical
malpractice cases).
112. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-225a (2014) (permitting the admission of collateral sources at
trial); see also Jones v. Kramer, 838 A.2d 170, 177 (Conn. 2004) (narrowly interpreting § 52-225a
to limit collateral source payments to those specifically corresponding to damages included in the
jury’s verdict).
113. GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-1 (2014) (prohibiting the receipt of benefits from sources other
than the defendant from operating to diminish the plaintiff’s recovery of damages); see also
Anepohl v. Ferber, 415 S.E.2d 9, 10 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992) (prohibiting admission of collateral source
evidence to a jury).
114. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-1606 (West 2014) (abrogating the collateral source rule by
requiring the decuation of payments from damage awards).
115. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.6303 (2014) (permitting collateral source evidence to be
introduced to a jury).
116. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2323.41 (West 2015) (replacing the common law collateral
source rule in Ohio); Jaques v. Manton, 928 N.E.2d 434, 439 (Ohio 2010) (holding that the trial
court erred in refusing to introduce collateral source evidence to the jury).
117. TIT. 9 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 9-19-34.1 (West 2014) (permitting introduction of
collateral source evidence to the jury).
118. TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-26-119 (2014) (abrogating the collateral source rule in medical
malpractice cases); see also State Auto. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hurley, 31 S.W.3d 562, 566 (Tenn. 2000)
(holding that the collateral source rule is not applicable in workers compensation cases).
119. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-3-405 (West 2014) (abrogating the collateral source rule in
medical malpractice cases); see also Wilson v. IHC Hosps., Inc., 289 P.3d 369, 384 (Utah 2012)
(applying Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3-405).
120. WASH. REV. CODE § 7.70.080 (2015) (replacing the common law collateral source rule in
the context of health injuries); Adcox v. Children’s Orthopedic Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 864 P.2d 921,
936 (Wash. 1993) (finding that the trial court erred in refusing to allow the jury to hear collateral
source evidence but holding that the error was harmless).
121. See Jones v. Bowie Indus., 282 P.3d 316, 328 (Alaska 2012) (holding that collateral source
evidence should be excluded unless it is highly probative of malingering).
122. See Roberts, supra note 87, at 125 (discussing the Colorado legislature’s provision for a
“contract exception” so that the trial court can apply the collateral source rule for certain benefits
following a damages verdict).
123. See Miller v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 993 A.2d 1049, 1056 (Del. 2010)
(prohibiting evidence that the injured party received compensation or payment for tort-related
injuries from a source other than the tortfeasor); but see DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18 § 6862 (2014)
(providing jurors factors to consider when collateral source evidence has been introduced at trial).
124. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.76(1) (West 2015) (allowing the court to reduce the award by
the total paid by some collateral sources); Sheffield v. Superior Ins. Co., 800 So. 2d 197, 203 (Fla.
2001) (prohibiting the admission of collateral source evidence).
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Indiana,125 Iowa,126 Kansas,127 Louisiana,128 Massachusetts,129 Minnesota,130
Missouri,131 New York,132 North Carolina,133 Oklahoma,134 Oregon,135
Pennsylvania,136 Texas,137 Wisconsin,138 and Wyoming.139

125. See Ind. Code Ann. § 34-44-1-2 (permitting some collateral source evidence in personal
injury and wrongful death cases to reduce the award).
126. See IOWA CODE ANN. § 668.14 (2015) (permitting some collateral source evidence); but
see Collins v. King, 545 N.W.2d 310, 312 (Iowa 1996) (prohibiting evidence of loss of earnings
from being introduced to the jury).
127. See Hayes Sight & Sound, Inc. v. ONEOK, Inc., 136 P.3d 428, 442 (Kan. 2006)
(permitting the collateral source rule, but allowing a setoff in the amount defendants paid to settle
plaintiff insurers’ subrogation claim).
128. See Suhor v. Lagasse, 770 So. 2d 422, 423 (La. Ct. App. 2000) (prohibiting application
of the collateral source rule to expenses written off by the operation of law governing Medicare).
129. See Corsetti v. Stone Co., 483 N.E.2d 793, 802 (Mass. 1985) (holding that evidence of
collateral source income may be admissible in a tort action at the discretion of the trial judge).
130. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 548.251 (West 2015) (prohibiting the introduction of collateral
source evidence, while permitting the court to reduce damage awards by offsetting some collateral
source payments received by the plaintiff).
131. MO. REV. STAT. § 490.715 (2015) (prohibiting introduction of collateral source evidence
to the jury, while permitting court to evaluate such evidence to determine the value of medical
services).
132. N.Y. C.P.L.R. LAW § 4545 (McKinney 2015) (prohibiting the introduction of collateral
source evidence to a jury, while providing that the court may reduce a jury award to offset receipt
of some collateral sources).
133. See Cates v. Wilson, 361 S.E.2d 734, 737 (N.C. 1987) (prohibiting introduction of
collateral source evidence of public benefits to a jury).
134. Estrada v. Port City Props., 258 P.3d 495, 505‒07 (Okla. 2011) (applying the collateral
source rule to retaliatory discharge proceedings prohibiting introduction of collateral source
evidence of unemployment benefits to a jury).
135. Gragg v. Hutchinson, 176 P.3d 407, 410 (Or. Ct. App. 2007) (prohibiting collateral source
evidence in civil actions for damages resulting from bodily injury or death); but see OR. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 31.580 (West 2015) (allowing court to reduce damages by considering select collateral
sources).
136. See Gallagher v. Pa. Liquor Control Bd., 883 A.2d 550, 557 (Pa. 2005) (permitting the
introduction of collateral source evidence only when evidence of recovery is a material issue in the
case).
137. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 41.0105 (West 2014) (permitting the collateral
source rule while limiting plaintiff’s recovery to expenses that have been or must be paid by or for
plaintiff); Haygood v. De Escabedo, 356 S.W.2d 390, 399‒400 (Tex. 2011) (applying statute to
limit evidence of damages to recoverable expenses).
138. WIS. STAT. § 893.55 (2015) (explicitly permitting collateral source evidence to be
introduced to the jury in medical malpractice actions); see also Lagerstrom v. Myrtle Werth
Hospital-Mayo Health Sys., 700 N.W.2d 201, 205 (Wis. 2005) (applying Section 893.55 to allow
collateral source evidence to be introduced to determine the reasonable value of medical services).
139. Garnick v. Teton Cnty. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 39 P.3d 1034, 1042 (Wyo. 2002) (prohibiting the
introduction of collateral source evidence to the jury, but holding that the trial court’s error of
admitting such evidence in this case was harmless).
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B. Subrogation
Subrogation varies from state to state but, at a basic level, all iterations support
“[t]he principle under which an insurer that has paid a loss under an insurance
policy is entitled to all the rights and remedies belonging to the insured against
a third party with respect to any loss covered by the policy.”140 The relationship
between subrogation and collateral source is fairly straightforward:
“[S]ubrogation rules found in many jurisdictions retain the collateral source rule
for important administrative and equitable purposes in the pre-verdict trial
process. Only where an insurer exercises its subrogation rights directly against
the defendant does the collateral source rule lose its purpose and abrogation
would appear appropriate.”141
It is worth reviewing how each state treats subrogation. Some states only
recognize subrogation as an equitable remedy, including Connecticut,142
Mississippi,143 Montana,144 Nebraska,145 Nevada,146 North Dakota,147 South
Carolina,148 South Dakota,149 and Tennessee.150
There is also contractual subrogation based on a specific clause in an
insurance policy.151 States relying on contractual subrogation include

140. J. Thomas Allen, ERISA Subrogation and Reimbursement Claims: A Vote to Reject
Federal Common Law Adoption of a Default “Make Whole” Rule, 41 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 223, 227
(2009) (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1467 (8th ed. 2004)).
141. Todd, supra note 4, at 997.
142. See AJJ Enter., LLP v. Jean-Charles, No. 36838, 2015 WL 5797101, at *9 (Conn. App.
Ct. Oct. 13, 2015) (holding that the decision as to whether to apply the doctrine of equitable
subrogation is at the discretion of the trial court).
143. See Hare v. State, 733 So. 2d 277, 285 (Miss. 1999) (recognizing the make whole doctrine
of equitable subrogation).
144. See Van Orden v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n., 318 P.3d 1042, 1045 (Mont. 2014)
(permitting only equitable subrogation that follows the make whole doctrine).
145. See Jensen v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Neb., 684 N.W.2d 537, 541‒42 (Neb. 2004)
(permitting only equitable subrogation that follows the make whole doctrine).
146. See Canfora v. Coast Hotels & Casinos, Inc., 121 P.3d 599, 604 (Nev. 2005) (permitting
subrogation only when following the make whole doctrine).
147. See Grinnell Mut. Reinsurance Co. v. Ctr. Mut. Ins. Co., 658 N.W.2d 363, 378 (N.D.
2003) (recognizing only equitable subrogation in certain circumstances).
148. See Langehans v. Smith, 554 S.E.2d 681, 683 (S.C. Ct. App. 2001) (recognizing equitable
subrogation); but see Shumpert v. Time Ins. Co., 496 S.E.2d 653, 658 (S.C. Ct. App. 1998) (holding
that equitable subrogation overrides contractual subrogation).
149. See Le Mars Mut. Ins. Co. v. Prehn, 238 N.W.2d 274, 277 (S.D. 1975) (holding that the
make whole rule overrides contractual subrogation obligations).
150. Abbott v. Blount Cnty, 207 S.W.3d 732, 735 (Tenn. 2006) (holding that the make whole
doctrine of equitable subrogation controls regardless of contractual provisions).
151. See Gary L. Wickert, The Societal Benefits of Subrogation, CLAIMS JOURNAL (Dec. 6,
2012), http://www.claimsjournal.com/news/national/2012/12/06/218682.htm.
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Arizona,152 Arkansas,153 California,154 Idaho,155 Illinois,156 Indiana,157
Kentucky,158 Maine,159 North Carolina,160 Vermont,161 and West Virginia.162
Many state policies permit both equitable and contractual subrogation,
including Colorado,163 District of Columbia,164 Iowa,165 Maryland,166

152. See Kobold v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 309 P.3d 924, 927 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2013) (holding that
subrogation can only be enforced if the insurance contract has an explicit subrogation clause).
153. See American Pioneer Life Ins. Co. v. Rogers, 753 S.W.2d 530, 532 (Ark. 1988) (holding
that equitable subrogation is not enforceable; only contractual subrogation is enforceable).
154. See 21st Century Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 213 P.3d 972, 976‒77 (Cal. 2009)
(recognizing the make whole rule, but holding that an insurer may specifically contract out of it
and that only contractual subrogation is enforceable by law).
155. See Rinehart v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. of Idaho, Inc., 524 P.2d 1343, 1346 (Idaho
1974) (holding that contractual subrogation is not contrary to public policy).
156. See Schultz v. Gotlund, 561 N.E.2d 652, 653‒54 (Ill. 1990) (permitting subrogation only
if expressly included in contract provision).
157. See Baxter v. I.S.T.A. Ins. Trust, 749 N.E.2d 47, 56 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (recognizing
contractual subrogation and applying the make whole rule, but not recognizing equitable
subrogation).
158. See Dodson v. Key, 508 S.W.2d 586, 587‒88 (Ky. 1974) (permitting contractual
subrogation, but not equitable subrogation).
159. See McCain Foods, Inc. v. Gerard, 489 A.2d 503, 504 (Me. 1985) (permitting contractual
subrogation, but not equitable subrogation).
160. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-48-20 (2014) (recognizing only contractual subrogation).
161. See Utica Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Cyr, 945 A.2d 361, 364 (Vt. 2008) (permitting contractual
subrogation).
162. See Ferrell v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 617 S.E.2d 790, 791, 793 (W. Va. 2005)
(recognizing contractual subrogation).
163. See DeHerrera v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 219 P.3d 346, 350‒52 (Colo. Ct. App. 2009)
(permitting both contractual and equitable subrogation and explicitly rejecting the make whole
rule).
164. See Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Riggs Nat’l Bank, 646 A.2d 966, 971 (D.C. 1994)
(recognizing that subrogation can be equitable or contractual).
165. See Allied Mut. Ins. Co. v. Heiken, 675 N.W.2d 820, 824‒25 (Iowa 2004) (recognizing
both contractual and equitable subrogation).
166. See Roberts v. Total Health Care, 675 A.2d 995, 1001 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1996)
(recognizing both contractual and equitable subrogation).
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Minnesota,167 New Hampshire,168 New Mexico,169 New York,170 Oklahoma,171
Pennsylvania,172 Rhode Island,173 Texas,174 Washington,175 and Wyoming.176
Finally, there is statutory subrogation. Many states retain statutory
subrogation in conjunction with equitable and contractual subrogation, including
Delaware,177 Florida,178 Hawaii,179 Kansas,180 Louisiana,181 Massachusetts,182

167. See Westendorf by Westendorf v. Stasson, 330 N.W.2d 699, 703 (Minn. 1983) (equitable
subrogation applies unless a contract provision explicitly provides contrary guidance).
168. See Chase v. Ameriquest Mortg. Co., 921 A.2d 369, 376 (N.H. 2007) (recognizing that
subrogation can be equitable or contractual).
169. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Found. Reserve Ins. Co., 431 P.2d 737, 741 (N.M.
1967) (recognizing equitable and contractual subrogation).
170. See Teichman by Teichman v. Cmty. Hosp., 663 N.E.2d 628, 630‒31 (N.Y. 1996)
(recognizing equitable and contractual subrogation).
171. See Reeds v. Walker, 157 P.3d 100, 113 (Okla. 2006) (holding that an insurance contract
is subject to the make whole rule unless the contract expressly states otherwise).
172. See Valora v. Pa. Emps. Benefit Trust Fund, 939 A.2d 312, 320 (Pa. 2007) (permitting
contractual subrogation only if it is also equitable in nature); but see 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §
1720 (West 2015) (prohibiting subrogation in motor vehicle liability insurance cases).
173. See Credit Union Cent. Falls v. Groff, 966 A.2d 1262, 1275 (R.I. 2009) (recognizing
contractual subrogation); Foote v. Geico Indem. Co., No. WC-2011-0040, 2013 R.I. Super. LEXIS
28, at *24 (R.I. Super. Ct. 2013) (recognizing make whole doctrine of equitable subrogation).
174. See Fortis Benefits v. Cantu, 234 S.W.3d 642, 648, 650 (Tex. 2007) (permitting both
equitable and contractual subrogation, but holding that contractual provisions control).
175. See Mahler v. Szucs, 957 P.2d 632, 640‒41 (Wash. 1998) (recognizing both contractual
and equitable subrogation and the make whole doctrine).
176. See Stilson v. Hodges, 934 P.2d 736, 738‒39 (Wyo. 1997) (recognizing contractual and
equitable subrogation).
177. DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 18, § 3320(b) (2014) (permitting contractual subrogation); see Baio
v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 410 A.2d 502, 506 (Del. 1979) (recognizing equitable subrogation).
178. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.76(4) (West 2015) (recognizing subrogation rights); see CentexRodgers Constr. Co. v. Herrera, 761 So. 2d 1215, 1216 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (recognizing
contractual and equitable subrogation in health insurance claims).
179. HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 346-37(d) (West 2015) (permitting subrogation in health
insurance claims); see Peters v. Weatherwax, 731 P.2d 157, 161 (Haw. 1987) (recognizing
subrogation as a principle in equity).
180. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 40-3113a (2013) (permitting subrogation to the extent of duplicative
personal injury protection); see Durrett v. Bryan, 799 P.2d 110, 116 (Kan. Ct. App. 1990) (allowing
statutory limitations on subrogation to trump subrogation clauses in insurance contracts and with
regard to PIP benefits).
181. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1825 (2014) (recognizing subrogation as conventional or legal).
182. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231B(d), § 1 (West 2015) (recognizing subrogation); see
Hartford Cas. Ins. Co. v. N.H. Ins. Co., 628 N.E.2d 14, 19 n.7 (Mass. 1994) (recognizing equitable
subrogation as a general rule by which insurers may recover); Morin v. Blue Cross, Inc., 311 N.E.2d
914, 915‒16 (Mass. 1974) (recognizing contractual subrogation rights).
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Michigan,183 Ohio,184 Oregon,185 and Utah.186 Meanwhile, a few states prohibit
subrogation altogether, including Georgia,187 Missouri,188 New Jersey,189 and
Virginia.190
Having reviewed the states, one can only conclude that subrogation is alive,
consequential, and unchanged by the implementation of the PPACA.
Considering the fact that the rules are largely functional, the idea that the
PPACA presented the opportunity to grossly tilt subrogation options and
collateral source evidentiary limitations in favor of defendants is simply
surprising. Moreover, there are essential remedies in medical malpractice cases
that exceed the amount an insurance company could recover through
subrogation. Given that tort recovery can include compensation beyond medical
damages, (e.g., lost earnings, pain and suffering, loss of consortium, and
diminished enjoyment of life), the scope of the compensable loss is broader than
the scope of the insured loss.191
Because there are few, if any, medical insurance policies that do not have
subrogation clauses, it is difficult for an insured person to enter into a
relationship with an insurance company without agreeing to a subrogation

183. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 550.1401(5) (West 2015) (recognizing subrogation in health
insurance cases); see Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Amoco Prod. Co., 658 N.W.2d 460, 465 (Mich.
2003) (holding that the insurer is entitled to full reimbursement from the employer on the basis of
equitable subrogation).
184. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2323.41(A) (West 2015) (expressly recognizing contractual and
statutory subrogation); see N. Buckeye Edu. Council Grp. Health Benefits Plan v. Lawson, 814
N.E.2d 1210, 1214 (2004) (holding that contractual subrogation overrides equitable doctrines such
as the make whole doctrine).
185. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 742.538(7) (West 2015); see Providence Health Plan v.
Winchester, 288 P.3d 13, 15‒16 (Or. Ct. App. 2012) (interpreting subrogation as a contractual
agreement between an insurance provider and an insured).
186. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-3-405(1) (West 2015) (recognizing subrogation rights); see
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Green, 89 P.3d 97, 101, 104‒05 (Utah 2003) (recognizing
equitable subrogation and holding that “in the absence of express [contractual] terms to the
contrary, the insured must be made whole before the insurer is entitled to be reimbursed from a
recovery from the third party tort-feasor”) (citing Hill v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 765 P.2d
864, 866 (Utah 1988)).
187. GA. CODE ANN. § 33-24-56.1(e) (West 2015) (expressly prohibiting subrogation in
medical and personal injury cases).
188. See Nevils v. Group Health Plan, Inc., 418 S.W.3d 451, 457 (Mo. 2014) (holding that
FEHBA does not preempt Missouri’s anti-subrogation rule).
189. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:15-97 (West 2015) (establishing New Jersey’s anti-subrogation
statute); but see Levine v. United Healthcare Corp., 402 F.3d 156, 165‒66 (3d Cir. 2005)
(explaining that Section 2A:15-97 is not an anti-subrogation law, does not regulate insurance, and
is preempted by ERISA).
190. See Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Enter. Leasing Co., 708 S.E.2d 852, 856 (Va. 2011) (defining
the anti-subrogation rule as prohibiting subrogation in cases in which injury was caused by the
negligence of the insured).
191. See Levenson, supra note 4, at 943.
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clause.192 The notion that insurance companies need even more leverage, via
the PPACA, is completely outside the stated purposes of the PPACA—a law
designed to expand the coverage of health insurance and improve the quality of
medical care.
There is also the compelling argument that “the [PPACA] has no legal effect
on the medical liability system and, therefore, is unable to create real reform in
this area.”193 It is true, however, that damage caps and medical malpractice cases
are very much part of the health care discourse.194 As discussed previously, the
dialogue on future medical expenses and the collateral source rule is far from
over.195
Given the aforementioned facts, it is simply incorrect to assume that the
PPACA would be the vehicle to undermine a patient’s legal claim to be
compensated when he or she is the victim of medical malpractice or third party
negligence. The PPACA was neither designed nor written to serve such a
perverse objective.
Overall, damage caps are a terrible idea—a well-documented terrible idea at
that.196 They artificially limit damages,197 deprive plaintiffs of much-needed

192. See Brendan S. Maher & Radha A. Pathak, Understanding and Problematizing
Contractual Tort Subrogation, 40 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 49, 85 (2008).
193. Rafael Andre Roberti, The Disappearing Provision: Medical Liability Reform Vanishes
from the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act Despite State Court Split, 4 LEGIS. & POL’Y
BRIEF 145, 147 (2012).
194. See supra notes 38‒43 and accompanying text.
195. See Levin, supra note 2, at 742 (discussing the need for collateral source rule reform now
that the PPACA is in effect); supra Part III.A.
196. A number of states have found that caps on noneconomic damages violate the state
Constitution. See, e.g., Moore v. Mobile Infirmary Ass’n, 592 So. 2d 156, 168‒70 (Ala. 1991);
Atlanta Oculoplastic Surgery, P.C. v. Nestlehutt, 691 S.E.2d 218, 220 (Ga. 2010); Lebron v.
Gottlieb Mem’l Hosp., 930 N.E.2d 895, 899, 914 (Ill. 2010); Best v. Taylor Mach. Works, 689
N.E.2d 1057, 1076‒77 (Ill. 1997); Brannigan v. Usitalo, 587 A.2d 1232, 1235‒36 (N.H. 1991);
Lakin v. Senco Prod., Inc., 987 P.2d 463, 474 (Or. 1999), clarified by 987 P.2d 476 (Or. 1999);
Sofie v. Fibreboard Corp., 771 P.2d 711, 721, 722, 723 (Wash. 1989); see also Amanda Edwards,
Comment, Medical Malpractice Non-Economic Damages Caps, 43 HARV. J. ON LEGIS., 213, 218‒
19 n.42 (2006) (claiming that the MICRA deprives injured patients of full relief); Melissa C.
Gregory, Note, Capping Noneconomic Damages in Medical Malpractice Suits Is Not the Pancea
of the “Medical Liability Crisis,” 31 WM. MITCHELL L. REV., 1031, 1036‒37 n.40 (2005)
(explaining why courts in many states that use caps have struck them down as unconstitutional);
David A. Matsa, Does Malpractice Liability Keep the Doctor Away? Evidence from Tort Reform
Damage Caps, 69 J. LEGAL STUD. S143, S176 (2007) (discussing how caps undermine medical
malpractice law); David Studdert et al., Are Damages Caps Regressive? A Study of Malpractice
Jury Verdicts in California, 23 HEALTH AFFAIRS 54, 65‒66 (2004) (cautioning against caps on
damages).
197. See Edwards, supra note 196, at 225‒26 (explaining how California defends the $250,000
damages cap under the MICRA).
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resources,198 undercut the deterrent effect of the tort system,199 skew settlement
negotiations,200 and, theoretically, effectuate a wrongful taking.201 Furthermore,
caps on noneconomic damages prevent juries from undertaking their mission or
mislead them into believing they are engaged in individualized justice only to
later see their efforts undone.202 Additionally, many argue that caps on
noneconomic damages fail to reduce malpractice premiums or decrease total
health care costs,203 and from an equitable perspective, caps are simply unfair to
patients who have suffered because of a physician’s negligence.204
Some jurisdictions have outright banned caps on damages.205 For example,
in Lebron v. Geottlieb Memorial Hospital,206 the Illinois Supreme Court held
198. See Matsa, supra note 196, at S148 n.11, S175‒76 (discussing how caps reduce
compensation to victims).
199. See id. at S144, S176 (discussing how damage caps could undermine the deterrent effect
of medical malpractice liability).
200. See Studdert et al., supra note 196, at 64 (describing how caps will influence a party’s
expectation of returns, which will impact settlement negotiation).
201. See Roberts, supra note 87, at 139‒40 (explaining how defendant tortfeasors often end up
with a windfall when the collateral source rule is not applied).
202. See, e.g., Sofie v. Fibreboard Corp., 771 P.2d 711, 721 (Wash. 1989) (stating that the
respondent tortfeasor’s argument in favor of capping noneconomic damages “ignores the
constitutional magnitude of the jury’s fact-finding province, including its role to determine
damages. Respondents essentially are saying that the right to trial by jury is not invaded if the jury
is allowed to determine facts[,] which go unheeded when the court issues its judgment. Such an
argument pays lip service to the form of the jury but robs the institution of its function. This court
will not construe constitutional rights in such a manner.”).
203. Compare Carol J. Miller & Joseph Weidhaas, Medical Malpractice Noneconomic Caps
Unconstitutional, 69 J. MO. B. 344, 350 (2013) (stating that “[c]ap supporters attribute medical
malpractice to rising healthcare costs, but a national study showed that the direct cost of malpractice
accounts for less than two percent of total national healthcare costs”), with Ryan T. Emery, Unwise
and Unnecessary: Statutory Caps on Non-Economic Damages in Medical Malpractice Cases and
the Appellate Review Alternative, 69 ALB. L. REV. 913, 916 (2006) (explaining that proponents of
caps believe excessive non-economic damages lead to higher premiums).
204. See Emery, supra note 203, at 928‒29 (concluding that statutory caps lead to arbitrary
damage awards that are unfair to the plaintiff).
205. See, e.g., Moore v. Mobile Infirmary Ass’n, 592 So. 2d 156, 168‒70 (Ala. 1991)
(discarding legislative authorization of caps, presuming the statute was predicated upon outdated
data, and holding that if the court were to “permit the legislature to act as the sole arbiter” such
would “vacate our judicial role”); Atlanta Oculoplastic Surgery, P.C. v. Nestlehutt, 691 S.E.2d 218,
220 (Ga. 2010) (finding that a statute capping noneconomic damages violates the right to a trial by
jury); Best v. Taylor Mach. Works, 689 N.E.2d 1057, 1076‒77 (Ill. 1997) (rejecting the argument
that the legislature annulled common law restrictions on caps, stating that “[t]he legislature is not
free to enact changes to the common law which are not rationally related to a legitimate
governmental interest”); Brannigan v. Usitalo, 587 A.2d 1232, 1235‒36 (N.H. 1991) (invalidating
a cap on damages statute, stating that “[i]f a court were to defer to a legislature’s findings that the
statue bore a ‘fair and substantial relation’ to the object of the legislation, it would be abdicating its
judicial role”); Lakin v. Senaco Prods., Inc., 987 P.2d 463, 474 (Or. 1999) (finding ORS 18.560(1)
in violation of the Oregon Constitution); Sofie, 771 P.2d at 721‒23 (concluding that the statutory
limit on damages violates the right to trial by jury).
206. 930 N.E.2d. 895 (Ill. 2010).
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that a cap on damages violates the separation of powers clause in the Illinois
Constitution because it infringes on a judge’s remittur power.207 In Atlanta
Oculoplastic Surgery, P.C. v. Nestlehutt,208 the Georgia Supreme Court found
that a cap on damages violated a plaintiff’s right to a jury trial.209 Additionally,
as noted earlier, the Leung court considered the argument that the import of the
PPACA was a constraint on damages for future medical costs—and then rejected
it outright.210
The fact that the PPACA’s boldest hope is that all persons have health
insurance does not mean that “future care and treatment will be covered.”211
Because the PPACA does not cover all future care and treatment, the medical
malpractice, i.e., tort, system continues to serve an important purpose by
providing plaintiffs the financial resources they need and deserve.
IV. COLLATERAL SOURCE AND CAPS
Tort reformists believe caps on damages will drive down the cost of medical
malpractice liability insurance; however, absent forced reductions by a state
insurance commission, they do not.212 Notwithstanding the failure of caps to
achieve anything other than reducing the accountability of negligent defendants
and depriving funds for plaintiffs, defendants in malpractice cases have
communicated the notable existence of the PPACA in an effort to skirt the
collateral source doctrine, potentially limiting damages calculated in
consideration of future medical care costs.213
For example, defendants in medical malpractice claims advocate “that the jury
should only award six months of future medical-care costs and the premiums,
deductibles and co-pays for a bronze level health insurance coverage under the
[PPACA] since full coverage would kick in after six months of uninsured
status.”214 Insurance companies, as a result, are attempting to influence federal
and state legislatures to consider any economic recovery that goes beyond

207. Id. at 914.
208. 691 S.E.2d 218 (Ga. 2010).
209. Id. at 220.
210. Leung v. Verdugo Hills Hosp., No. B204908, 2013 WL 221654, at *10‒11 (Cal. Ct. App.
Jan. 22, 2013).
211. Id. at *11.
212. Glassman, supra note 89, at 459 (analyzing what happened in California after the state
legislature passed a statutory cap on noneconomic damages, concluding that the cap increased
malpractice premiums).
213. Bruce G. Fagel, The Collateral Source Rule Under the Affordable Care Act, PLAINTIFF
MAG. 1, 1 (Jan. 2014), http://plaintiffmagazine.com/Jan14/Fagel_The-Collateral-Source-Ruleunder-the-Affordable-Care-Act_Plaintiff-article.pdf (stating that “[s]ince the enactment of the
Affordable Care Act (ACA) the defense bar has moved quickly to add the ACA as a collateral
source that could potentially reduce most of an injured plaintiff’s recovery for future medical-care
costs”).
214. Id.
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insurance payments to be a windfall.215 Some states, unfortunately, have
reacted. In a number of states, legislatures have enacted tort reform statutes that
modify or eliminate the collateral source doctrine, which, in effect, “limit[s]
economic damages to the amount the medical care provider accepted from the
plaintiff’s health care insurer as satisfaction for the medical bills.”216
There is no rational basis to assert that revealing existing insurance coverage
at trial coupled with further damage caps will advance anything other than the
bottom line for insurers. States have, in many ways, already slashed recovery
potential for injured patients.217 Believing that the PPACA would take a final
bite of what remains is an erroneous interpretation. Moreover, experience in the
field suggests this outcome is at odds with the best interests of the public.218
Several examples that support this assertion follow.
In 1975, California enacted caps on medical malpractice with The Medical
Injury Compensation Reform Act (MICRA).219 The MICRA imposes a
$250,000 cap on compensation paid to victims for noneconomic injuries and
eliminated the collateral source rule.220 Yet, even after the enactment of
MICRA, malpractice liability insurance premiums continued to rise.221 Next,
California enacted California Insurance Code Section 1861.01, known as
Proposition 103, which required insurance premium rollbacks of up to twenty
percent.222 Medical malpractice insurance premiums in California nevertheless
stabilized; however, this stabilization was due to “the regulation of insurance
rates, and not to caps on non-economic damage awards.”223 Finally, Civil Code
Section 3333.1, part of the MICRA legislation, eliminated the traditional
collateral source rule for medical malpractice cases and “allowed a shifting of
the liability for a plaintiff’s medical-care costs from a defendant health-care
provider to the plaintiff’s health-insurance company.”224 The statute also allows
a defendant to present evidence of the plaintiff’s collateral source benefit,
including health insurance.225 The California legislature rationalized that juries
who knew about a plaintiff’s collateral source benefit would set damages at a

215. See Roberts, supra note 87, at 101‒02.
216. Id. at 102.
217. See Sue Ganske, Noneconomic Damages Caps in Wrongful Death Medical Malpractice
Cases—Are They Constitutional?, 14 FLA. ST. U. BUS. REV. 31, 32 (2015); Kenneth M. Sigelman,
Unhappy Birthday California’s Med-Mal Cap Turns 40, 51 TRIAL 48, 48 (2015); Alan G. Williams,
The Cure for What Ails: A Realistic Remedy for the Medical Malpractice “Crisis,” 23 STAN. L. &
POL’Y REV. 477, 479 (2012).
218. See Furrow, supra note 8, at 47.
219. Glassman, supra note 89, at 458.
220. Id. at 458.
221. Id. at 459.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Fagel, supra note 213, at 29.
225. Id.
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lower level.226 However, Section 3333.1 has done little to reduce increased
insurance rates, generated little economic incentive to improve quality of care,
and marginalized aggrieved patients by making it more difficult to find adequate
representation.227
The Texas legislature codified the state position on the collateral source rule
in Texas Civil Practices and Remedies Code Chapter 41.0105, which states that
the “recovery of medical or health care expenses incurred is limited to the
amount actually paid or incurred by or on behalf of the claimant.”228 In Haygood
v. De Escabedo,229 the Texas Supreme Court, interpreting the statute, held that
a claimant’s recovery of medical expenses are limited to those that have been or
must be paid by or for the claimant.230 After Haygood, juries no longer heard
evidence of the full amount of billed medical expenses, which reduces noneconomic damages figures and settlement amounts.231 As a result, damages
calculated in consideration of “future medical expenses will be noticeably more
complex than in the past,”232 and could, in jury trials, yield ineffectual and
inaccurate damage awards.233
A few other states have taken less direct approaches. For example, Oklahoma
permits admission into evidence of paid-for medical expenses,234 while a similar
North Carolina statute limits evidence of medical expenses only to the amount
paid.235 The Colorado legislature weakened the collateral source rule by
requiring trial courts to reduce the victim’s damage award by deducting
whatever collateral source benefits the victim received.236 Indiana Code Section
34-44-1-2 allows the defendant to present evidence of write-offs or lowered
payments to satisfy medical bills in a personal injury action.237 In Connecticut,
courts allow evidence of collateral source payments and allow damages to be

226. Id. (citing Fein v. Permanente Medical Group, 38 Cal. 3d 137 (1983)).
227. Jonathan J. Lewis, Putting Micra Under the Microscope: The Case for Repealing
California Civil Code Section 3333.1(a), 29 W. ST. U. L. REV. 173, 185‒86, 190, 192‒93 (2001).
228. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §41.0105 (West 2013).
229. 356 S.W.3d 390 (Tex. 2011).
230. Id. at 391.
231. Benjamin A. Geslison & Kevin T. Jacobs, The Collateral Source Rule and Medical
Expenses: Anticipated Effects of the Affordable Care Act and Recent State Case Law on Damages
in Personal Injury Lawsuits, 80 DEF. COUNSEL J. 239, 248 (2013).
232. See id. at 251.
233. Jamee Cotton, How Much Are You Worth?: Why the Texas Supreme Court Took Tort
Reform Too Far in Limiting the Admissibility of Certain Medical Expenses During Trial, 45 TEX.
TECH L. REV. 565, 591‒92 (2013).
234. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 3009.1 (West 2015).
235. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 8C-1, Rule 414 (West 2015).
236. Roberts, supra note 87, at 125 (citing COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-21-111.6 (West
2015)). Notable, however, is a part of the Colorado statute that “provides for a ‘contract exception’
and retains the collateral source rule for certain benefits.” Id.
237. Id. at 128 (citing IND. CODE ANN. § 34-44-1-2 (West 2010)).
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“offset by the amount paid by collateral sources less any amount paid by the
claimant to secure the benefit.”238
There is simply no public benefit to consumers from this strained approach to
tort and insurance law, and it is impossible to conclude that any interests were
served beyond those of the insurance industry.
Having reviewed the states, the question remains: does the PPACA further
dilute the collateral source doctrine? The answer is a resounding no. As
Professor Todd notes, the PPACA “appears to leave the collateral source rule
unchanged despite the Act’s otherwise sweeping changes to the health insurance
system and aspirations of providing universal healthcare coverage to all
Americans.”239 To the extent it survives and prohibits the use of collateral
sources, the collateral source rule saves jurors from making difficult calculations
in an attempt to determine the actual medical damages paid by the plaintiff, a
calculation that could drastically differ depending on the degree of insurance
coverage.240 The rule simplifies this burdensome calculation to “a more
straightforward, market-cost approach” more appropriate for jurors.241
Consider the original intent of the collateral source rule. The rule was
designed to prevent a tortfeasor from becoming unjustly enriched—not to
prevent the victim from being compensated. Nevertheless, a number of states
that have enacted tort reform statutes now focus on preventing the injured party
from receiving a windfall.242 It is unthinkable that additional remedial
limitations are needed via the PPACA.
Even after generations of legislative debate and the passage of the PPACA,
which was undertaken with an eye to greater efficiency in delivering health care
services, nothing in the PPACA embraces the mistaken notion that modifying
collateral source or enhancing insurance subrogation options would affect a
savings of any consequence.
V. CONCLUSION
The idea that the PPACA operates as a stealth vehicle for tort reform perverts
obvious congressional intent. Having failed to secure major federal tort reform,
devotees of limiting accountability and restricting or eliminating access to the
courts seized on the one successful piece of legislation they could find and

238. Id. at 130 (citing CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-225a (West 2015)).
239. Todd, supra note 4, at 968.
240. See id. at 976.
241. Id. at 986.
242. See Donna P. Moye & William R. Moye, The Collateral Source Rule: New Approaches
to Loss Allocation, FOR THE DEFENSE 66, 67 (2013), http://www.tklaw.com/files/Publication/
458482ad-ca11-43ef-a714-be7796cdc39d/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/29a639ba-35ab-48
79-9d87-a4377d241189/FTD-1308-MoyeMoye.pdf (highlighting a number of states that have
moved away from the traditional collateral source rule).
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claimed that it was designed to limit liability, allow admissibility of collateral
sources, and enhance subrogation rights.243 The PPACA does no such thing.
The idea that the PPACA is technical tort reform designed to cap damages,
render admissible collateral sources, or fundamentally change subrogation is
absolutely wrong. For the PPACA to do so would change the civil liability
system in a way that “undermines the traditional disincentives of tort law
intended to compensate victims as well as to discourage negligent conduct.”244
The PPACA is not a shadowy tinkering of the health care system designed so
one item on the tort reform agenda could be achieved. There are no covert lines
in the PPACA, snuck in at the eleventh hour that suddenly resurfaced as a means
to erode the rights of an injured patient or consumer. This was the nation’s
political system at its best, passing legislation that furthered big ideas, a grand
vision affecting all. When the PPACA is seen in that context, the notion that
Congress was out to slice off small segments of consumer rights is simply
ridiculous.

243. See, e.g., Joshua Congdon-Hohman & Victor A. Matheson, Potential Effects of the
Affordable Care Act on the Award of Life Care Expenses, 11‒12 (Coll. of the Holy Cross, Dept. of
Econ. Faculty Research Series, Working Paper No. 12-01, 2013), http://college.holycross.edu/
RePEc/hcx/Matheson-Congdon_ACATortAwards.pdf (arguing the PPACA indirectly, yet
significantly, constitutes tort reform, suggesting the individual mandate limits damages calculated
in consideration of future medical care); Kimberly Schroder, The Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act May Be Plaintiffs’ Foe in Personal Injury Actions, HALL RENDER LITIG. ANALYSIS (Dec.
10, 2012), http://blogs.hallrender.com/litigation/2012/12/10/obamacare-may-be-plaintiffs-foe-inpersonal-injury-actions/ (advocating for the preclusion of “full price” future medical expenses on
the grounds that the PPACA’s individual mandate renders such evidence irrelevant).
244. Irma S. Russell, The Logic of Legal Remedies and the Relative Weight of Norms:
Assessing the Public Interest in the Tort Reform Debate, 39 AKRON L. REV. 1053, 1065 (2006)
(citing John C.P. Goldberg, The Constitutional Status of Tort Law: Due Process and the Right to a
Law for the Redress of Wrongs, 115 YALE L.J. 524, 526 (2005) (stating that a vital and accessible
civil justice system provides that “American citizens have a right to a body of law for the redress
of private wrongs”)).

